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ACCIDENT INSURANCE-INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE-AccIDENT.-FuRBUSH V.
'CASUALTY Co., 91 N. W. 135 (MICH.).-There was evidence tending to show
that insured was intentionally killed by another. Held, that an intentional
homicide is an accident within the meaning of an accident policy.
Accident policies are of recent origin and the question is a modern one.
Such authorities as can be found give "accident" its popular meaning, i. e.,
disasters not brought about through the intention or design of the assured.
See Ripley v. Ins. Co. (Mich.), 2 Big. Rep. 738; Richards v. Ins. Co., 89 Cal.
17o, and Robinson v. Association, 68 Fed. 825.
ATTORNEYS-DISBARMENT-DEcEIT-PREvIOUS CONVICTION.-IN RE WEED,
68 PAC. 1115 (MoNT.).-Held, that an attorney should be disbarred without
previous prosecution for a criminal act outside of his official capacity.
The courts may disbar without previous conviction where the acts
charged against an attorney were not done in an official capacity as well as
where they were. People v. Appleton, 105 Ill. 474; Perry v. State, 3 Greene
(Iowa) 550. Contra, State v. Capman, I Ohio 430; Ex parke Steinnan and
Hensel, 95 Pa. St. 220. Against the objection that at least an attempt should
be made at criminal prosecution before disbarment, see Delano's Case, 58
N. H. 5, and Ex parte Walls, 64 Ind. 461.
CARRIERS-INJURY TO PASSENGER-POSTAL CLERK-NEGLIGENCE OF AN-
OTHER CORPORATIONo-STODDARD V. NEW YORK, N. H. &. H. R. R. Co., 63
N. E. 927 (MAss.).-A railway company's mail car in which was plaintiff.
a postal clerk, being sidetracked at a terminal, was run into by the car of
another company. Held, in an action for injuries, one corporation is not
liable for for the negligence of the servants of another.
Liability can extend only to limit of control. Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt.
213; R. R. Co. v. Burke, 28 Amer. Dec. 488. Use of tracks by another road
is no exception, in that lessee is agent of lessor. Driscoll v. R. R. Co., 3-"
Ati. 354. In this case, agreement for common use does not mean joint lia-
bility. 9 Amer. Dig., Sec. 1264c.
CARRIERS-INJURIES TO PASSENGERS-MEASURE OF DUTY-CHARGE TO
JURY.-ERRILL V. METROPOLITAN ST. RY. Co., 77 N. Y. Sum'. 122 (1902).-
Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's car, was injured by another passenger's
being thrown against her by a jolt of the car rounding a curve. Held, a
charge that it was the duty of defendant's servants "to conduct themselves
with reasonable care under all the circumstances, with a view of protecting
their passengers," was correct. O'Brien and Hatch, JJ., dissenting.
Courts have generally held that the duty of carriers of passengers is to
use in all cases "the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons."
Maverick v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 378; Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co.
v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291. But contra, Stierlc v. Railway Co., 156 N. Y. 70
(1898). The strict rule is not universally applicable; and the better principle
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is said to be, that "in every case the degree of care to be exercised is dependent
upon the circumstances." Followed in Keegan v. Railroad Co., 54 N. Y.
Supp. 391 (i898); Zimmer v. Railroad Co., 55 N. Y. Supp. 3o8 (i88), and
in the present case. But this principle seems to have been accepted in no
other State. Its soundness is questioned in 3 Thomp., Neg., Secs. 2748, 3481
(ed. i9o2).
CARRImS-INJuRy TO PASSENGER ON FREIGHT TRAIN-LIABILITY.-CRUM
V. KANSAS, FT. S. & M. Ry. Co., 68 S. W. 88 (Mo.).-Plaintiff was injured
by sudden stop of freight train on which he was a passenger. Held, that he
was entitled to look for only such security as that mode of conveyance is
reasonably expected to afford; otherwise the liability of the railroad company
is the same as though he was a passenger on a passenger train.
This decision is generally upheld. Crine v. East Tenn. V. & G. Ry. Co.,
84 Ga. 651; Fitchburg R. Co. v. Nichols, 85 Fed. 945; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Axley,
47 Ill. App. 3o7. But in R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, the U. S. Supreme
Court held that as to passengers on freight trains "the highest degree of
carefulness and diligence is expressly exacted."
CONTRACTS-PREVENTION OF PERFORMANCE BY THIRD PERSoN-DAMAGES-
PROFITS.-PENDER LUMBER Co. v. WILMINGTON IRON WORKS, 41 S. E. 797
(N. C.)-Plaintiff was prevented from performing a contract by failure of
a third person to repair plaintiff's machinery according to contract. Held,
in an action for damages consisting of the loss of profits, that an estimate of
cost of production of certain articles was properly admitted in evidence.
Furches, C. J., dissenting.
Damages for the loss of profits is an extraordinary special damage. If
the data of estimating the profits be so definite and certain that they can be
ascertained by reasonable calculation, they can be recovered. Jones v'. Call,
96 N. C. 337; Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 4o4. But the party at fault must
have had notice either of the nature of the contract itself, or explanation that
such damages would ensue from the non-performance. Moreover, the plaintiff
must not remain inactive but should make reasonable exertions to reduce his
losses and diminish responsibility of the party in default. Railroad Co. v.
Ragsdale, 46 Miss. 458.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-BURDEN OF PROoF-AuTOMOBILES.-THIES v.
THOMAS, 77 N. Y. Supp. 276.-A boy of six, while playing between blocks, was
run over by an automobile and killed. In an action by administrator, held.
that the burden of proof, to show absence of contributory negligence, was on
plaintiff.
Where the burden of proof lies, to establish contributory negligence, is a
much disputed question. This ruling, though following the later New York
decisions, Whalen v. Citizens' Gas Co., 151 N. Y. 70, is not followed uni-
formly in the earlier New York cases. Jackson v'. Hudson R. R. Co., 22 N. Y.
65; Lorickio v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 6o N. Y. Supp. 247. The opposite rule
is followed in the Federal Courts, Chicago G. W. Ry. Co. v. Price, 97 Fed. R.
423; in England, Beach. Cont. Neg., Sec. i56; and in the majority of the
States. Allen v. Townahip of Warwick, 9 Pa. Sup. Ct. 5o7; Pullman Palace
Car Co. v. Adams, 24 So. 912 (Ala.); Gulf C. and S. F. Ry. Co. v,. Shieder,
30 S. W. 902 (Tex.). This last case reviews the whole course of decisions
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on this subjedt, in an exhaustive opinion. For the Massachusetts rule see
Warren v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 8 Allen 227.
CORPORATIONS-CONTRACT-CONsIDERATION-EQUITABLE RELiEF KENDALL
V. KLAPPERTHAL Co. Er AL., 52 ATL. 92 (PA.).-Two corporations were
created, owned and- managed in the interest of a third corporation. Certain
directors of the parent company indorsed notes of one of the others and
having paid them, were reimbursed from funds of the original company.
Held, that their relation was a sufficient consideration to warrant this.
There can be no doubt that directors of a corporation can reimburse
themselves for loss from indorsement of its paper; I Moraw., Priv. Corp., Sec.
526; 3 Thompson, Corp., Sec. 4o69; but an extension of the dictum to accord
with the above facts seems contrary to the rule that, unless expressly author-
ized by charter, one corporation cannot lend its credit to another. Smith v.
Alabama L. Ins. Co., 4 Ala. 558. So it was ultra vires for a railroad corpo-
ration to guarantee the dividends of an elevator company. 30 Am. and Eng.
R. R. Cas. 522. The decision in the case in hand rests solely on the basis
that, if necessary, courts of equity will look behind the artificial personality
to the individuals who compose it. Rice's Appeal, 79 Pa. I68; Gas Co. v.
West, 50 Iowa i6.
DEFEcTIV SIDEVALK-WHAT CONSTITUTES.-BIEDER V. ST. PAUL, 91 N.
W. 20 (MINN.).-Plaintiff was injured by slipping on a hexagonal cement
block depressed on one edge an inch and a quarter below the level of the
sidewalk. Held, that this defect was such as to render the city liable for
damages. Lewis, J,, dissenting.
The extent of use of the street is made the test of liability, but the
courts generally hold that slight defects will not render the municipality
liable. In Beltz v. Yonkers, 148 N. Y. 67, for a similar, but more pronounced
defect there was no liability. See also Jackson v. Lansing (Mich.), 8o N. W.
8; Morgan v. Lewiston, 91 Me. 566; Morris v. Philadelphia, 45 Ati. io68
(Pa.), and 24 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law go.
EvIDENcE-DECLARATIONs-PEDIGREE.-WASHINGTON v. THE BANK FOR
SAVINGS IN CITY OF NEW YORK, 63 N. E. 831 (N. Y.).-Testimony as to
declarations of deceased to the effect that she had never had any children was
introduced for the purpose of showing that accounts with defendant bank "in
trust for son John" and "in trust for son Thomas" were in reality for the
benefit of the deceased herself. The testimony was held competent as a
matter of pedigree.
From the time of The Buklecy Peerage Case, 4 Camp. 4o (decided in
I81), on, this exception to the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence
has been repeatedly recognized both here and in England. Stein v. Bowman,
13 Pet. 209; Eisenlord v. Clum, 126 N. Y. 552; Dawson v. Myall, 45 Minn.
408. While, undoubtedly, the principle involved in declarations as to the
existence, or non-existence, of children is the same, nevertheless authorities
in support of the latter statement are so rare as to make this decision worthy
of notice. See Butrick v. Tilden, 155 Mass. 461.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-WHAT CONSTITUTE-REMOVAL OF CAUSEs.-CAL-
VERT V. SOUTHERN RY. CO., 41 S. E. 963 (S. C.) .- The South Carolina statute
-fixes conditions under which foreign corporations may become domestic. The
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Southern Ry. Co., a Virginia corporation, having complied with these pro-
visions, was sued by a citizen of South Carolina in the courts of that state.
Held, that the railway company was not a citizen of South Carolina, and was
therefore entitled to a removal of the cause to the federal court. Gary,
A. J., Pope, J., and Townsend, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
The weight of authority would seem to be with the dissenting opinion.
In a Kentucky case it is stated that a foreign corporation does not become
a corporation of that State by being licensed to do business in a State, but
is suable as a non-resident; yet if a corporation is created by the adoption
of a foreign corporation, its status is the same as if it had been originally
incorporated by the State adopting it. Uphoff v. Chicago R. Co, 5 Fed.
545. Alabama, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia courts
have upheld this view. Contra, Markwood v. Southern Ry. Co., 65 Fed.
817. The two cases on which the opinion of the court is chiefly based are
not wholly parallel to the case in hand. In one the plaintiff was herself a
citizen of the State of the defendant's original incorporation. R. R. Co. v.
James, 161 U. S. 545, 4o L. Ed. 8o2. In the other the plaintiff, as an Indiana
corporation, sued a Kentucky corporation, although itself domesticated in
Kentucky. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552.
INJUNCTION-PUBLICATION OF LIBEL.-MARLIN Fmz.Ams Co., v. SHIELDS,
64 N. E. 163 (N. Y.).-Defendant published "fake" letters falsely attacking
the quality of articles manufactured by plaintiff. Plaintiff brought bill in
equity to enjoin further publication, alleging that he had no adequate remedy
at law and that it was impossible to ascertain or prove special damages.
Held, that publication could not be enjoined.
For a discussion of the principles involved, see XI Yale Law Jou'rnal 372,
where the opinion of the Appellate Division, now reversed, was commented
upon and adversely criticised.
INSURANcE-ADDITIONAL INsURANcE-EsToPPEL-RAUcH v. MICHIGAN
IMILLERS' INs. Co., 9I N. W. i6o (MIcH.)-Where a policy holder took
out additional insurance contrary to the terms of the policy, but notified the
company which did not reply, held, that the company is estopped from
claiming that the policy is avoided. Prant, J., dissenting.
No recovery can be had where additional insurance is taken out contrary
to the terms of the policy. Continental Ins. Co. v. Hullman, 92 Ill. 145;
Ill. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Fix, 53 Ill. 151; Germania Ins. Co. v. Klewer,
129 Ill. 6oo. But the principle that the silence of the company indicates that
it is willing to continue the policy, is well established in Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 42 II. 66; Ill. Fire Ins. Co. v. Stanton, 57 Ill. 354; Williamsburg City
Ins. Co. v. Cary, 83 Ill. 453.
JURISDICTION-STATE BOUNDARIES-ADJACENT WATERS.-LENNAN v. HAM-
BURG-AMERICAN S. S. Co., 77 N. Y. Surpp. 6o.-Held, the New Jersey courts
have jurisdiction of an offense committed on the seas within three miles of
the New Jersey shore.
By the law of nations, every nation has exclusive jurisdiction to the
distance of a marine league over the waters adjacent to its shores. Church
v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 234; The Brig Ann, I Gallis. 62. And over all bays
wholly within the territory of the country which do not exceed two marine
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leagues at the mouth. Con:. v. Gaines, 2 Va. Cas. 172; Direct U. S. Cable
Co. v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 394. But the border States of
the Union have their boundary lines co-existent with the national boundaries;
and hence the State courts have the same exclusive jurisdiction over ad-
jacent waters as over other parts of their territory, except in so far as
jurisdiction has been expressly granted to the general government. People
v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161; U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; Cons. v. Manchester,
152 Mass. 23o.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY-CYcLIST RIDING IN A RAcE-QUESTION FOR
THE JURy.-BENEDICT V. UNION AGRIc. SOCIETY, 52 AT. 110 (VT.).-In an
advertised bicycle race for which prizes were offered and entrance fees
charged, a racer lowered his head over his handle-bars so that he failed to see
and avoid a sulky, driven on the track preparatory to the succeeding race.
Hcld, that contributory negligence on rider's part was a question for the jury.
This appears to be an attempt to establish contributory negligence on a
new state of facts which modern bicycle racing has made possible. As two
inferences could be drawn from the facts, it was for the jury to decide as to
plaintiff's conduct. Hathaway v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 29 Fed.
489; Hart v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 8o N. Y. 622. As a matter of law
he was not negligent. Had he been riding on the highway as he did in
the race, the rule in Butterfield v. Forrester, ii East 6o, would have applied,
but "he conformed to the rules laid down and followed by others in a similar
line of business and, as a matter of law, that was all he could be asked to do.
PRIVATE NUISANCE-POWDER MAGAZINE-PROxIMITY TO DWELLINGS-
EXPLOSION.-REILLY v. ERIE R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. Supp. 62o.-The plaintiff and
her dwelling were seriously injured by the explosion of a large quantity of
dynamite, stored in the powder magazine of the defendant, situated less than
ioo feet from her own, and several other dwellings. On appeal, held, that
the jury were justified in finding that the keeping of such a quantity of
explosive, in such a locality, was a nuisance, irrespective of negligence.
This decision, making the character of the storage of explosives as a
nuisance, depend upon locality and surrounding circumstances, and not upon
negligence, follows the great weight of authority. Heeg v. Licht, 8o N. Y.
579; McAndrews v. Collerd, 42 N. J. L. i89. Some decisions go even farther,
holding the keeping of gunpowder a nuisance per se. Laflin Rand Powder Co.
v. Tierney, 23 N. E. 389. The dissenting opinion in the present case held that
liability must depend on negligence in locating and storing the powder, and
thus construed Heeg s,. Licht, cited above. This is not the usual interpretation
of that case, see Cooley on Torts, 723. The other cases cited in support of this
novel view may be distinguished as referring to various kinds of business which
only become nuisances through the negligent manner in which they are carried
oil. Bohan v. Gaslight Co., 122 N. Y. IS; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476.
SERVANTS-INJURIES-EMPLOYER'S LIARIL1rTY-MINTE-NANCE OF A S.AE
WORKING PLAcE.-McLAiNE v. HEAD & DoWST Co., 52 ATL. 545 (N. 11.).-A
servant, at work at the bottom of a deep trench into which earth was bcing
dumped from time to time, was injured through the neglect of a foreman
to give warning of the approach of one load. Ileld, that the employcr,
having provided a competent servant to give this warning, was not liable for
the injury. Remick, J., dissenting.
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It is a duty of the master to maintain the working place of the servant
in a reasonably safe condition. Nall, Adm'x, v. Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co., 129 Ind. 260. In England, it is established that the master fully dis-
charges this duty by appointing competent servants to act for him. Walter,
Adm'x, v. The South Eastern Ry. Co., 2 H. L. C. io2; although some
inclination to restrict this doctrine is apparent. Smith, Master and Servant,
p. 257; Stat. 43 and 44 Vic., c. 42. In this country, the English rule has
been adopted by several States. 54 L. R. A. 12o, note "f." But the Circuit
Court of Appeals holds that this duty is non-delegable, so as to exempt the
master from liability. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Ward, 6i Fed.
927. And many of the State courts have decided similarly. Louisville E. &
St. L. C. R. Co. v. Hanning, 131 Ind. 528; Anderson v. Michigan Cent. R. R.
Co., io7 Mich. 591; and have therein the strong support of text writers.
Wharton, Neg., Secs. 211, 212, 232; 1. F. Dillon, Employer's Liability, 24
Am. Law Rev. 175. It would seem a nearer approach to justice to hold
that the implication in the contract of service is one requiring the employer
to exercise reasonable care to secure to the servant a safe working place,
even when acting through an agent, rather than one compelling the servant
to assume the liability for the neglect of that agent. Hough v. Radlway Co.,
100 U. S.213.
SERVANT-INJURIES-EMPLYEgs LIAmaTY-"SupmoR SERVANT" RULE.
-KNuTTER V. NEW YoRx & N. J. TEL. CO., 52 ATL. 565 (N. J.)-A general
district superintendent, with power to hire and discharge, negligently caused
injury to a workman under his authority. Held, that the superintendent and
workman were fellow-servants, and hence the employer was not liable for the
injury.
In holding that mere superiority of rank of one servant over another is
not sufficient to destroy the relation of co-service, so as to make the master
liable for injury done by the former to the latter, the Court follows the
preponderance of decision; Wilson v. Merry, I H. L. Sc. App. 326; Central
R. Co. v. Keegan, i6o U. S. 349; Moody v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., I59 Mass. 7o,
and of text-book authority; Shearm. & Red., Neg., Sec. 100; 3 Wood, Rail-
-way Law, Sec. 388; although a few States maintain the opposite. Cleveland,
Col. & Cin. R. Co. v. Keary, 3 0. St. 201 ; and the denial that the- power to
hire aid discharge is the criterion for determining whether the liability rests
-on the master or not is also well supported; Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan,
168 U. S. 86; Pierce, Rec'r v. Oliver, 18 Md. 87; although this is the accepted
doctrine in one State, Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Williams, 75 Tex. 4, and is
upheld by commentators, Shearm. & Red., Neg., Sec. 1o3; Wood, Master
-and Servant, Sec. 448. But there is strong authority to support the view
that one having general charge of a separate department, with power to hire
and discharge, as in the case in question, is not a fellow servant; Northern
Pac. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346; Lanning v. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521;
Wood, Master and Servant, Sec. 446; Redfield, Railways, pp. 528, 529 and
-note; despite a not very widespread recognition of it, and its absolute denial
by one court. Albro v. Agawan Canal Co., 6 Cush. (Mass.) 75.
TAXATION-ATTEMPT TO EScAPE.-BRowN ET AL. v. NEWELL ET AL., 41
S. E. 835 (S. C.).-A. released a prior note and mortgage to B. and then
executed a subsequent note and mortgage to C., which was assigned to B.
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and bore date of the first mortgage, such date being nearly a year previous to
execution. The condition of the second mortgage was the satisfaction of
record of the first. Fraud was not alleged in the complaint. Neither was
the defrauded party (the State) before the court. Held, that the defandant
did not intend thereby to evade taxation, and that said mortgage and note
constituted a valid contract which could be enforced by a court of equity.
Mclver, C. J, dissenting.
Disclosure of fraud against the government is generally fatal to the case.
If the illegality is not alleged, but is first disclosed by evidence, the court
itself will pursue the inquiry. Parken v. Whitby, T. & P_ 366. But there
is some discrepancy of opinion in respect to the certainty with which the
illegality must be established. Johnson v. Shrewsbury Ry., 3 De G. M. &
G. 914, held the illegality must be simply shown by convincing evidence.
Lord Hatherley stated, in Auben v. Holt, 2 K. & J. 66, that it is not within
the discretion of the court to refuse specific performance because an agree-
ment savors of illegality. The latter opinion has the weight of authority.
Can the defendant, being in pari delicto, avail himself of the equitable
doctrine that no court will lend aid in enforcing an agreement entered into in
violation of law? If executed, a court of equity will not grant aid. Solinger
v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393; York v. Merritt, 77 N. C. 213. If executory, it cannot
be enforced by any kind of action brought directly upon it. The defense of
illegality is allowed from motives of public policy rather than in regard to
interests of the objecting party. See decision by Lord Mansfield in Holnan
v. Johnson, I Cowp. 341.
TAX4TION-STATUTORY ExEmPTIONS-LAND OWNED BY CITY-CITY OF
CINCINNATI v. LEWIS, AUDITOR, 63 N. E. 588 (Onio).-The city of Cincin-
nati owned land which was rented to a private person and by him used for
farming purposes. Held, that the land was subject to taxation.
It is a general rule that land owned by a municipality and not used in the
actual exercise of its municipal functions is subject to taxation. Town of
West Hartford v. The Board of Water Commissioners, 44 Conn. 360. It is
not exempt, though leased and the rent applied to a public purpose. City of
Louisville v. Commonwealth, I Duvall 296 (Ky.).
TELEGRAPH COmPANIES-FAILURE TO DELIvER MESSAGE-MENTAL AN-
GUISH.-SPARKMAN V. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO., 41 S. E. 881 (N. C.).-
Plaintiff received a message that his brother had died and telegraphed back,
"Shall we look for him or what are you going to do?" The company failed
to deliver the dispatch. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover damages
for mental suffering. Douglas, J., dissenting.
This case illustrates the limitations placed upon the "mental anguish"
doctrine by those courts which recognize it. A company will not- be held
liable where there is nothing in the language of the message to indicate that
mental anguish would naturally result. Shear. & Red.,. Neg., Sec. 756. Nor
is there liability for failure to deliver message intended to relieve mental
anxiety already existent in sender's mind. Rowell v. Tel. Co., 75 Tex. 26.
But the weight of authority is against recovery for mental anguish alone
under any circumstances. Francis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 58 Miun. 252; Morton
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v. W. U. Tel. Co., 53 0. St. 431. Indiana and Virginia have recently takenthis majority view. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64; Connelly v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 4o S. E. 618.
JOINT TORT FEASORS-RELEASE OF ONE RELEASES A.L.-AB V. NORTHERN
PAC. Ry. Co., 68 PAC. 954 (WsH.).-Injuries were occasioned by the joint
carelessness of the Grant Street Electric Co. and defendant. Plaintiff upon
consideration of partial satisfaction released the street electric company from
all damages, but expressly reserved the right to hold the defendant. Held,
an absolute release of the one released the other also.
The weight of authority supports the doctrine that when the full amount
of damages is ascertainable by direct positive proof, an absolute release of
one, on consideration of partial satisfaction, is not a bar. Cooley on Torts,139; Ellis v. Essan, 6 N. W. 518 (Wis.); Sloan v. Herrick, 49 Vt. 327.There are conflicting decisions where the damages rest mainly upon the
opinion of a jury. The present case is supported by Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio89; Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 6o. A contrary view, however, is taken infatthew v. Chicopee Mfg. Co., 3 Robt. (N. Y.) 713. An agreement to dis-
continue a suit against one, in the absence of full satisfaction, was held to
operate as a bar to further action in Mitchell V. Allen, 25 Hun 543, and4yer v. Ashmead, 31 Conn. 447; but it was not so held in Lovejoy v. Murray,3 Wall. (U. S.) I, and Chamberlin v. Murphy, 41 Vt. 11o. A distinction was
made between a technical release, and one merely by implication, in Bloss v.Plymale, 3 W. Va. 393, where a receipt in full given to one tort-feasor did
not release the others.
WILLS-PROBATE-TETAMENTARY CAPACITY-EXPERT WITNESSES-IN-
STRUCTIONS.-IN RE BLAKE'S ESTATE, 68 PAC. 827 (CAL).-The lower courthad instructed the jury that the opinions of experts, although competent as
evidence, were frequently unsatisfactory and unreliable, and that such opinions
were not entitled to as much weight as facts. Held, that the instruction was
erroneous as matter of law.
By the principle that the credibility of witnesses is exclusively within theprovince of the jury, the court must not disparage expert testimony. Louis-
z ille, etc., R. Co. v. W Vitehead, 71 Miss. 451; -White v. Fox, I Bibb (Ky.)371. But the court may instruct that expert evidence of opinion should be
received with caution. Rogers' Expert Test. 451; Maye v. Herndon, 30 Miss.
118; Grigsby v. WTatcrworks Co., 40 Cal. 396. And the instruction of thelower court seems to have gone no further than the cautionary instruction in
Benedict v. Flanigan, 18 S. C. 5o6: "All testimony founded upon opinion
merely is weak and uncertain and should in every case be weighed with great
caution."
